2013 NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual Report, Issued January 2014 - International Space Station, Commercial Crew Risk and Budget, SpaceX, Exploration Program by unknow

Author:unknow
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Progressive Management
Published: 2014-01-14T16:00:00+00:00

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Vice Admiral Joseph W Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chair

Dr. James P. Bagian

John C. Frost

Deborah L. Grubbe, P.E.

John C. Marshall

Joyce A. McDevitt, P.E.

Dr. Donald P. McErlean

Dr. George C. Nield

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Annual Report for 2011

NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC 20546

VADM Joseph W. Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chair

January 25, 2012

The Honorable Charles F. Bolden, Jr.

Administrator

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546

Dear Mr. Bolden:

Pursuant to Section 106(b) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155), the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is pleased to submit the ASAP Annual Report for 2011 to the U.S. Congress and to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

This report is based on the Panel's 2011 fact-finding and quarterly public meetings; "insight" visits and meetings; direct observations of NASA operations and decision-making; discussions with NASA management, employees, and contractors; and the Panel members' past experiences.

In our report we highlight issues on cost, schedule, resources, requirements and acquisition strategy that impact safety. Further, we again note the uncertainty regarding goals and objectives and the need for clarity and constancy of purpose. Importantly, we also acknowledge several of NASA's many accomplishments during calendar year 2011. We observe that transparency, the evolution of a safe and open culture, and key process advances have all significantly improved under your leadership.

A key and honest question that we pose is: "How safe is safe enough?" The pursuit of great reward often comes hand in hand with great risk—so it has always been with explorers. The answer to the question must come from a balance between risk and reward and should reflect a consensus among the American people, the White House, the Congress, and NASA. It is not our intent or purpose to answer the question; however, we point to areas where we believe the stated requirement may not produce the requisite safety. We especially invite your attention to the section "Reassessment of Space Shuttle Risks" and the historical gap between anticipated and deployed systems risk.

In this report, we have assumed that the purpose of the commercial crew initiative is to facilitate the near-term development of a U.S. commercial space transportation capability to achieve safe, reliable, and cost-effective access to and from low-Earth orbit (LEO). However, some among the stakeholders believe human transport to LEO is not the primary intent of the commercial crew initiative. They believe the intent is, instead, to foster a domestic U.S. space industry over a longer time horizon. We note that attention to and investment in safety are critical in developing near-term transport to LEO but may not be as significant in seeding a future industry. Some of the funding decisions and the resultant shifts in acquisition strategy give credence to those who believe the objective has indeed changed. We believe clarity is needed, and constancy of purpose must follow in either regard. We strongly believe those setting national strategy, providing resources, and planning for execution must all share in acknowledging and shouldering the risk.

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